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Abstract
Without enforced standards or reliable third-party verification, food safety threats
such as pesticide residues and aflatoxin contamination are generally unobservable
or only partially observable to both buyers and sellers, especially of staple foods in
rural maize markets in sub-Saharan Africa. As a result, sellers have more informa-
tion about food quality than do buyers. Such information asymmetries can impede
market development and undermine human health. We study farm household
behaviour in the context of imperfect food safety information. We pool observa-
tions obtained from 707 food storage containers maintained by 309 farm house-
holds in Benin, surveyed following the maize harvests of 2011/2012 and 2013/2014.
Our results indicate that when a household perceives a food safety risk associated
with application of insecticides, on average it is 33 percentage points less likely to
apply insecticides to maize it intends to consume than it is to maize it intends to
sell. These individuals are also more likely to sell maize than households without
food safety concerns. Results highlight the potential value of improved storage
technologies and quality control to promote market transactions and reduce hidden
health risks.
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1. Introduction
Do food safety concerns influence a farm household’s decision to apply storage
chemicals? Do these factors affect the household’s decision to sell grain, thereby creat-
ing the potential for unsafe food to be sold in rural markets? In this article, we investi-
gate these issues in Benin’s rural maize markets. At present, inconsistent and
poor-quality grain is prevalent in many markets in Benin, a phenomenon widely
observed elsewhere in developing countries, especially sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Faf-
champs, 2004; Hodges et al., 2011). Improving the quantity and quality of food is a
fundamental component of efforts to modernise the food supply chain in low-income
settings. Because low quality food is often associated with food safety concerns and
potential health risks, the presence of low-quality grain also reduces the scope for
smallholders to participate in international markets.
Given the range of relevant issues, it is somewhat surprising that improving food
quality and safety has received relatively little attention in most countries of sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA). In general, food quality consists of both observable and unob-
servable attributes. For cereals such as maize, observable quality attributes that may
affect food safety include insect damage and mould. Buyers and sellers can typically
assess these characteristics during market transactions. In Benin, for example, Kadjo
et al. (2016) find that appropriate adjustments for observable reductions in quality
are built into maize prices, either explicitly or implicitly. In contrast, unobservable
attributes such as the presence of aflatoxins and other mycotoxins or chemical resi-
dues remain hidden to both buyers and sellers, and thus impede the development of
food markets. They can also introduce serious health risks (Hoffmann and Gatobu,
2014; Hoffmann and Moser, 2017).
Since sellers know their storage practices, they potentially have more information
than buyers about the unobservable attributes that affect the quality of food items
offered for sale. This information asymmetry creates the potential for adverse selec-
tion (Akerlof, 1970; Fafchamps, 2004). For example, if buyers cannot observe pesti-
cide residues themselves, cannot easily test for residues, and cannot obtain reliable
information about grain quality from a third party, price adjustments based on qual-
ity are unlikely because buyers cannot readily differentiate between safe and unsafe
grain. This reduces the returns to preserving high quality grain that is free from chem-
ical insecticides and other contaminants and creates disincentives for farmers to
market high quality food.2
Even though food safety concerns due to aflatoxin and pesticide residues are major
problems with marketed maize in SSA, asymmetric information might not be a sys-
tematic characteristic of maize transactions in informal markets. In fact, many small-
holders have limited knowledge of the potential harm chemical residues and/or
aflatoxins may cause (Williamson et al., 2008; Fafchamps et al., 2008; Narrod et al.,
2011; N’dede et al., 2012).3 As a result, they may not necessarily consider these attri-
butes when spraying or drying their maize. In this context, asymmetric information
2Tanguy et al. (2017) use evidence from the onion markets in Senegal to show that farmers who
knew in advance that their products would be graded by an external entity invested more in
quality-enhancing technology.
3In a study of 2,689 farmers in Nigeria, only 32% reported knowledge of mycotoxins (Idahor
and Ogara, 2010). In Benin, Ghana and Togo, awareness rates were 20.8% among a sample of
farmers and 26.7% among traders (James et al., 2007).
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about unobservable quality attributes depends on sellers’ subjective beliefs about the
risk of food contamination from their storage practices.
Accordingly, our first objective is to investigate the quality of maize marketed by
rural smallholder households in Benin. In doing so, we test two related hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 tests whether a household is equally likely to apply storage chemicals to
maize that it intends to sell and maize that it intends to consume. Hypothesis 2 tests
whether the probability of storage chemical application to maize a household intends
to sell increases with its awareness of food safety risks.4 Our second objective is to
evaluate whether, and to what extent, adverse selection occurs in the market. To do
this, we test two additional hypotheses. Hypothesis 3 tests whether sales are related to
expenditures on storage chemicals. Hypothesis 4 tests whether bad grain is driving out
good grain from rural markets, in the sense that informed sellers (i.e. those who are
aware of food safety risks) who use insecticides are more likely to sell maize than their
uninformed counterparts.
We test these hypotheses using two-wave panel data collected after the 2011/2012
and 2013/2014 harvest seasons in Benin. We use a balanced panel of 309 households
who were surveyed in each wave to analyse households’ market behaviour in the face
of potential adverse selection. In our sample, some households reported multiple stor-
age units, which they designated alternately for home-consumption and/or sales. This
provides an opportunity to work with 707 ‘container-level’ observations to analyse
how households apply chemical insecticide to specific units of grain, depending on
intended use.
We recognise that a household’s subjective belief about the risk of food
contamination creates potential endogeneity between the treatment and sales deci-
sions. To address this issue, we use a Mundlak Chamberlin device (analogous to a
fixed effects estimator in non-linear models) to control for unobservable household-
level heterogeneity. We also account for other covariates that might be correlated with
households’ perception about the risk of food contamination. We then conduct a ser-
ies of robustness checks in which we compare our results under parsimonious regres-
sions with fully specified regressions. To measure the perceived risk of food
contamination we use two variables that capture a household’s attitude regarding
consuming maize sprayed with chemical insecticide. The first is the number of days
the household believes it must wait (or usually wait) between spraying and consuming
maize in order to render it safe. The second is a binary variable equal to one if the
household considers the presence of chemical on maize to be unsafe for consumption,
and zero otherwise. To rid our estimation of any confounding effect and ensure that
these two variables measure the risk of food safety, we use a set of covariates that
determine the household’s knowledge about good storage practices as control vari-
ables. Although these steps are directed at correcting for potential endogeneity, we
refrain from making strong causal inferences since we rely on observational data.
Nevertheless, the findings should identify associations between a household’ subjec-
tive belief about the risk of food contamination and its decisions regarding market
participation.
4One might view the fact that a household aware of the risk of food contamination applies
chemical insecticide on a maize container as a moral hazard behaviour. However, in this context
we emphasise the adverse selection side of the story in the sense that a household’s decision to
use chemical insecticide may lead to bad quality being sold into markets.
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To date, there is limited understanding of how quality concerns affect market
participation in informal food markets in developing countries. Arslan and Taylor
(2009) found that rural households in Mexico prefer to produce and consume their
own crop, even at a cost well above the market price. Fafchamps et al. (2008) showed
that information about the type of application of pesticide and post-harvest treatment
is not passed along the value chains in non-staple food markets in India. Conse-
quently, growers receive no incentive regarding unobservable crops attributes and are
only interested in agricultural practices that raise the quantity sold or improve observ-
able characteristics. Hoffmann and Gatobu (2014) were the first to attempt to explain
smallholder farm households’ limited market participation in staple markets through
the asymmetric information that exists for unobservable quality attributes. They used
an experimental auction in which households were offered the opportunity to sell their
maize and then, the following day, the opportunity to buy it back or buy replacement
maize from the market. They found that participating households placed a higher
value on own-produced maize vis-a-vis maize sourced from markets. They attribute
the observed difference in willingness-to-pay as reflective of food safety concerns, and
the asymmetric information between buyers and sellers. Our study builds on Hoff-
mann and Gatobu (2014) by explicitly estimating and testing how adverse selection
could arise in informal markets.
2. Maize Quality and Marketing in Benin
Maize is the main staple in Benin, as in many other parts of SSA. Maize production
and storage practices differ across regions in Benin due to local consumption patterns
and spatial differences in the comparative advantage of maize compared with other
crops. For example, maize is produced for domestic consumption in the south and as
a cash crop in the north, where it is viewed as an alternative to cotton as a source of
cash income.
Access to improved storage technologies remains a pressing constraint in many
countries in SSA. Maize producers in Benin continue to face substantial storage losses
because there is no modern technology that is readily available to households to pre-
serve stocks from pest damage over extended periods (ADA, 2010).5 Recommended
chemical insecticides for stored maize such as Actellic and Sofagrain were promoted
in Benin by projects that facilitated credit access and supply of these insecticides dur-
ing the 1990s (Adegbola, 2010). Unfortunately, the implementation of these projects
did not address other long-term constraints to adopting these new technologies, such
as high costs and low availability (Adegbola, 2010). Likewise, modern storage tech-
nologies, such as hermetic bags and metal silos that effectively eliminate storage losses
from insects without using chemicals have not been successfully promoted in Benin.
As a result, at the time of our study many rural households still used traditional con-
servation measures, such as ash or neem, or field insecticides, especially those mar-
keted for cotton, and other chemicals they believe appropriate to deal with pest
damage (Adegbola, 2010; Hell et al., 2008; Williamson et al., 2008). Even though
these inappropriate pesticides may protect maize stocks from pest damage, their wide-
spread use among households raises serious health concerns. For instance, fatal cases
5Our data suggest that storage losses are about 7% on average (with 8.5% as the standard devi-
ation), and that 10% of the sampled farmers face storage losses higher than 15%.
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of chemical poisoning by misuse of chemical insecticides were reported in the early
2000s in Benin (Williamson et al., 2008). Yet until recently, many farmers still sourced
both field and storage chemicals from informal and non-certified sources (Adechian
et al., 2015).
Most maize marketed in Benin passes through informal channels. The lack of for-
mal quality control in these informal markets creates the potential for asymmetric
information between market participants. In the absence of quality control, market
participants implement their own practices to verify maize quality. For example,
wholesale traders may sample a portion of maize they intend to purchase to check
quality, using informal practices such as smelling grain to detect the odour, or biting
grain to check for moisture.
3. Conceptual Framework
We follow Hoffmann and Gatobu (2014) to investigate how households’ efforts in
improving maize quality during the harvest season affect their actual market beha-
viour during the post-harvest season. During the harvest season, households spend
time and money to harvest (reap, thresh, winnow), dry, transport, sell and store
maize. In the post-harvest season households consume, sell and/or purchase maize.
As in Antle and Pingali (1994) and Liu and Huang (2013), we account for the fact that
some storage practices such as the use of insecticides may yield both positive effects
(e.g. reduced insect damage) and negative effects (e.g. chemical contamination that
could pose a health risk). To explain market participation behaviour we expand on
Hoffmann and Gatobu (2014) by emphasising how a household’s subjective belief
about unobservable quality attributes could influence market participation during the
post-harvest season.
We consider a non-separable farm household model where a risk averse household
with demographic characteristics Z maximises its utility during the post-harvest sea-
son from consuming (superscript c) a staple food ½qchðaÞ sourced from their own pro-
duction (subscript h) or purchased (subscript p) from market [qcpðbÞ] where q
represents maize quantity, a and b represent attributes that can be either good unob-
servable (u) or bad unobservable (u) traits.6 The household also obtains utility from
consuming a non-food good (x).
We can state the household’s maximisation problem as follows:
MaxUðqchðaÞ þ qcpðbÞ; x;ZÞ: ð1Þ
Quality attributes are increasing in a set of storage practices such as the use of stor-
age inputs (n), and labour time (l) allocated to practices such as drying. A household
may adopt these practices to achieve positive quality attributes ðuÞ while at the same
time generating negative attributes ðuÞ:7 We assume the household forms a subjective
assessment about the food safety of maize at the time of storage. Let q represent the
6We simplify attributes (a) and (b) to only unobservable attributes, the main interest in this
article.
7For example, some practices such as inappropriate drying or insecticide use could affect maize
food safety and cause health risk. Inappropriate drying here refers to practices such as drying
grain directly on the bare ground or not allowing sufficient time for drying. Drying on the bare
ground increases the risk of contamination by fungi that produce aflatoxin, whereas insufficient
drying results in wet maize that is more susceptible to mould.
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probability that a household suspects that the negative attribute could be harmful.
We can write the expected quality for unobservable (u) such as:
E uð Þ ¼ uE ¼ q uð Þ þ 1 qð Þu: ð2Þ
We can also write the negative attribute as a relative rate of chemical contamination
in safe maize such that u ¼ su with the non-zero parameter s being <1. If s = 1 then
there is no residue, so that safe maize is obtained. Equation (2) becomes:
E uð Þ ¼ uE ¼ qsuþ 1 qð Þu ¼ 1 ð1 sð Þq½  uð Þ ¼ 1 q0ð Þ uð Þ: ð3Þ
Equation (3) shows that under a risk of food contamination the household knows
that good unobservable characteristics may not be achieved because of the potential
risk of chemical residues.
Furthermore, let us assume a situation where the household achieves good maize
quality ðuÞ. The household allocates its stock Qð Þ to consumption ðqchÞ or sales qmh
 
as
shown in equation (4); the superscripts (c) and (m) representing consumption and
sales, respectively.
Q ¼ qchðuÞ þ qmh ðuÞ: ð4Þ
Equation (5) is the income balance:
p:q pnn uE
  wl uE þ pmh uð Þqmh ðuÞ pcp bð ÞqcpðbÞ þ x: ð5Þ
The parameters p and q represent the price and the quantity of maize sold during
the harvest season, respectively, while the parameters pn and w denote the price for
insecticide storage, and the labour wage, respectively. The price for the non-food
good, x, is normalised to one. A household invests in insecticides and labour during
the harvest season because it expects to achieve a certain maize quality in the post-
harvest season, represented by uE. In equation (5) the parameter pmh is the price a
household receives for selling maize during the post-harvest season, whereas pcp is the
price they pay for purchasing maize from the local informal market.
We consider an alternative situation where a household wants to decide how to
choose the amount of maize to sell when that maize could have been allocated to con-
sumption.8 Thus, maize sales become an endogenous variable.
If the households are indifferent to quality, then simple first-order conditions with
respect to the endogenous variables qmh , q
c
p, and x leads to the standard result of the
ratio of marginal utility equates to the price ratio.





þ kpmh uð Þ ¼ 0: ð6Þ
The parameter k is the Lagrange multiplier for equation (5). The parameter Uqm
h
is the
marginal utility with respect to the amount of maize sold.
If the household is concerned about maize quality, we can extend the maximisation
problem, adding an additional endogenous variable for quality, u. The new marginal
utility for consuming maize with a given quality attribute will increase more than
before due to the link between quality and quantity. In other words, marginal utility
8The fact that many households (40% in our sample) buy back maize shows that they do not
necessarily secure consumption first.
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with respect to maize quality increases because marginal utility is increasing in maize
quantity, and maize quantity is in turn, increasing in maize quality.9 The first-order





















When we substitute equation (6) in equation (7), we can rewrite equation (7) as:
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The left-hand side of equation (9) is the marginal value of the investment in quality
preservation. The right-hand side represents the marginal cost of the efforts invested
in quality preservation. Equation (9) indicates that the marginal cost of the efforts to
obtain good quality is equal to the sum of (i) the value gain from the additional
amount of maize due to the quality improvement, and (ii) the price premium for qual-
ity in the market.10 The value gain from the additional amount of maize is achieved if
the household decides to sell this additional amount obtained from quality improve-
ment into markets. By contrast, price premium depends on market characteristics.
Thus, if there is little if any price premium, as we may assume given the current mar-
ket structure in many sub-Saharan markets, efforts may be costlier than the market
will pay for. Consequently, a rural household may not find it optimal to allocate a
large amount of maize if any with good quality attributes uð Þ to markets. This is more
so in a situation where uncertainty of the quality of maize to purchase from markets
is high.
However, equation (9) has somewhat different implications if a household believes
the use of a chemical insecticide might be unsafe, i.e. a situation where the probability
of risk of residue is different from zero. Consequently, we obtain a new form of the
chemical use equation where the decision depends on expected attributes. Assuming a
linear form of a household’s decision to use an input (chemical) based on expected
quality, we can write the marginal effect of chemical use under the new form (nf) that




¼ 1 q0ð Þ @n uð Þ
@u
ð10Þ
Equation (10) implies that we can derive a general form for equation (9) that
includes a household’s subjective belief about maize safety from storage practices such
as insecticide use.
9We assume that uE  u in the post-harvest season, i.e. that the household achieves the
expected quality.
10A household may obtain additional maize because insecticides reduce pest damage and there-
fore reduce quantity losses. Then, the household cannot consume a quantity of maize that
exceeds its needs during the post-harvest season nor can it keep maize over an extended period.
Hence, the effect on sales is more likely to be positive.
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Equation (11) implies that the presence of the parameter (1  q0), which is ≤1, may
reduce the marginal cost of investment in quality improvement (right-hand side).
Therefore, we argue that the marginal cost of investment in quality improvement or
the reservation value for consuming grain quality from home-grown maize is lower
under a perceived risk of food contamination (0 < q0 < 1) than otherwise (q0 = 0).
This new equilibrium implies that a seller who suspects a risk of food safety could sell
more maize into markets than an unsuspecting seller. The subsequent empirical esti-
mation investigates whether this prediction applies to rural transactions in Benin’s
maize markets.
4. Empirical Strategy
4.1. Testing Hypotheses 1 and 2
Our first objective is to identify which maize quality a household will most likely sell into
markets. Equation (12a) represents a binary response model in which the dependent
variable, is equal to one if a household i applies chemical insecticides ðChemijtÞ to maize
stored in container j during the agricultural year t, and equals zero otherwise:
PðChemijt ¼ 1jSal; Unsafe; XÞ ¼ Uða0 þ a1Saleijt þ a2Unsafeit þ Xa3 þ ai þ uijtÞ:
ð12aÞ
P(.) indicates probability, Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution func-
tion. The variable Saleijt denotes the household’s intended storage goal for the con-
tainer of maize. The goals are either (i) home consumption only, (ii) sale only, or (iii)
both home consumption and sale. We use consumption as the base storage goal, and
the parameter a1 denotes the corresponding coefficient estimate for the variable Saleijt.
When the variable Saleijt equals one for sale only, the coefficient a1 tests Hypothesis
(1) that a household’s goal for sale has no statistically significant effect on its decision
to apply insecticide to maize intended for sale compared to maize held in a container
that is stored for home consumption.
The variable Unsafejt denotes a household’s subjective belief about the risk of food
contamination from the use of insecticide. It alsoreflects the level of asymmetric infor-
mation about maize safety that buyers are aware of. To measure the risk of food
safety we use two variables by emphasising the household’s attitude with respect to
consuming maize sprayed with chemical insecticides. The first is a continuous variable
that mimics the probability of a risk of chemical residues. We asked households the
number of days they believe they must wait (or they usually wait) between spraying
and consuming maize to render it safe. We call this variable the latency period or the
number of days for maize safety.11 We assume that the longer latency period, the
greater is a household’s subjective belief about risk of food contamination. The
second is a binary variable constructed by asking households whether they would
consume maize treated with chemical insecticides themselves. It takes a value equal to
11Guidelines suggest maize treated with Actellic Gold Dust can be consumed 2 weeks following
application.
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one if a household considers the presence of chemicals on maize to be unsafe and
therefore inappropriate for consumption irrespective of any supposedly risk prevent-
ing practices such as soaking or drying grain. To rid our estimation of any confound-
ing effect and ensure that these two variables only pick up the risk of food safety, we
carefully net out the effect of knowledge by controlling for variables that represent a
household’s potential sources of information about recommended storage practices.
The vector X comprises these variables and other covariates such as the number and
the type of storage containers. The parameter ai represents household-level unob-
served heterogeneity whereas the parameter uijt is the idiosyncratic error.
We modify equation (12a) to investigate how a household applies insecticide to
maize held for sales when it perceives a risk of food contamination as opposed to a sit-
uation where no risk is perceived. To do so we include an interaction term between a
household’s storage goal and its subjective belief about the risk of food contamination
as specified in equation (12b):
PðChemijt ¼ 1jSal; Unsafe;XÞ
¼ Uðb0 þ b1Salijt þ b2Unsafeit þ b3Salijt Unsafeit þ Xb4 þ ai þ uijtÞ
:
ð12bÞ
With the presence of the interaction term, we can further investigate the potential
risk of adverse selection by assessing which maize quality is most likely sold into mar-
kets. The supposedly ‘good-quality grain’ is a maize stock intended for sale that a
household unaware of the risk of food contamination would spray with chemical
insecticide. The estimate and the statistical significance of the coefficient b1 evaluates
how likely an uninformed household is to spray this type of maize compared to home-
consumed maize. Conversely, ‘bad-quality grain’ is maize for sale that a household
who is aware of risk of food contamination sprays with chemical insecticide. The joint
estimate and the statistical significance of the coefficients b1 and b3 test Hypothesis 2,
namely that the probability that a household that is aware of the risk posed by apply-
ing chemical insecticides to maize would more likely spray grain intended for sale than
grain intended for home consumption. A positive coefficient b3 would suggest that the
more a household perceives a food safety concern from using insecticides, the more
likely it will be to apply chemical insecticides on a container intended for uses other
than consumption (i.e. sales, or sale & consumption).12
4.2. Testing Hypotheses 3 and 4
Our second objective is to estimate how a household’s investment in chemical
insecticides affects the quantity of maize it sells during the post-harvest season. A
12A test of the joint significance of b1 and b3 is a sufficient but not necessary condition to deter-
mine the presence of an interaction effect in a non-linear model (Greene, 2010). Like the mar-
ginal effect of a single variable, the magnitude of the interaction effect depends on all the
covariates in the model. But it can have different signs for different observations, making sum-
mary measures of the interaction effect difficult (Ai and Norton, 2003). Therefore, unlike single
variables, conditional effects cannot be simply inferred by assessing the sign and statistical sig-
nificance of the coefficient of the interaction term (Ai and Norton, 2003; Greene, 2010). Build-
ing on Ai and Norton (2003), Greene (2010) indicates that graphical presentations of the
predictive effects are a very informative adjunct to the numerical results of the interaction effect.
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logical assumption is that the container-level behaviour we previously investigated
might determine actual market transactions. However, we are unable to identify the
quantity of maize sold that is initially sourced from a given storage container. There-
fore, we analyse market transactions at the household level for Hypotheses 3 and 4,
while accounting for the key determining variables of the container-level behaviour.
We consider a household’s market participation decision to consist of two
independent decisions, the decision to sell maize and the quantity to sell. Our
interest is to analyse how investments in storage technologies and practices drive
the quantity to sell. Equation (13a) specifies a linear model of the factors that
affect the quantity of maize sold into markets conditioned on the decision to sell
as follows:
Qit ¼ h1Expit þ h2Unsafeit þ Zith3 þ bi þ eit: ð13aÞ
where the variable Qit represents the kilograms of maize sold in the market by
the household i during the post-harvest season t, estimated in log form. Expit
represents households’ expenditure on storage chemical insecticides. The estimate
and the statistical significance of the coefficient h1 tests Hypothesis 3: that invest-
ments in insecticides have no statistically significant effect on the amount of
maize that a household sells in the market. The vector Z comprises households’
characteristics and market variables. It also includes container-level variables
such as households’ storage goal and the number of storage technologies. The
parameter biis a household-level fixed effect to account for unobserved hetero-
geneity, and the parameter ɛit is the idiosyncratic error. The variable Unsafeit is
defined as before.
To evaluate how households’ beliefs about food safety and quality affect the deci-
sion to sell, we specify equation (13b), which adds to equation (13a) an interaction
term between expenditures on chemical insecticides and households’ subjective belief
about the risk of food contamination:
Qit ¼ d1Expit þ d2Unsafeit þ d3Expit Unsafeit þ Zitd4 þ bi þ eit: ð13bÞ
The presence of the interaction term contrasts the effect on sales of a household’s
investments in insecticides under two risk situations. We cantest the presence of
adverse selection in maize markets by assessing whether ‘bad quality’ sellers trade
the most into markets. The supposedly ‘good-quality sellers’ are in fact uninformed
households who spend on chemical insecticides, but do not actually suspect the risk
of food contamination. We evaluate the effect of this category of households on
maize sales through the estimate and the statistical significance of the coefficient d1.
In contrast, ‘bad-quality sellers’ are those who spend on chemical insecticides while
suspecting the risk of food contamination. We evaluate the effect of this category on
market transactions through the joint estimate and statistical significance of the coef-
ficients d1 and d3. Thus, a positive and statistical significant coefficient d3 tests
Hypothesis 4, that ‘bad quality sellers’ sell more of their stocks than ‘uninformed
sellers’ do.13
13The quality produced by the two types of sellers is not necessarily the same even though they
may adopt the same practices. Because the quality attribute is unobservable and many house-
holds are uninformed, what matters is the quality as perceived by theeller.
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5. Identification Strategy
5.1. Omitted variable bias
The use of panel data in this context allows us to address the issue of unobserved
heterogeneity. Since we estimate equations (12a) and (12b) as binary response models
via probit, the use of fixed effects could result in inconsistent parameters when applied
to non-linear models due to the incidental parameter problem (Wooldridge, 2010).
We circumvent this issue by using the Mundlack-Chamberlin (MC) device that deals
with unobserved heterogeneity, denoted as ai in non-linear models (Mundlak, 1978;
Chamberlain, 1984). Using the MC-device, the assumption of independence between
covariates and unobserved heterogeneity can be relaxed by modeling ai in a linear
form as follows:
ai ¼ uij þWinþ eit: ð14Þ
The MC device assumes that eitj Xit Normalð0; r2i Þ where W is the household time
average of all time-varying covariates in equations (12a) and (12b). This specification
provides estimates that are analogous to household FE (within) estimation (Wool-
dridge, 2010). The MC device is also appropriate for dealing with unobserved hetero-
geneity in equations (13a) and (13b).14
In addition, we deal with potential omitted variable bias for a household’s storage
goal in equations (12a) and (12b), as one could argue that this variable is not random.
In this application storage goal is measured at the harvest period and therefore before
the household applies chemical insecticide to a storage container. Moreover, we
believe that accounting for households’ physical and liquidity assets in equa-
tions (12a) and (12b) could address any omitted variable bias issues. Indeed, it is well
known that credit and assets are constraints to market participation in rural areas
(Carter and Barrett, 2006; Barrett, 2008; Stephens and Barrett, 2011). These factors
could also affect the household’s ability to acquire chemical insecticides. In addition,
we evaluate the robustness of our estimate by comparing a parsimonious estimation
to a full regression.
Because we define the use of chemical insecticides as an endogenous variable in
equations (12a) and (12b), we also deal with potential omitted variable bias for the
covariate expenditures on insecticides in the model of market participation (equa-
tions (13a) and (13b)). We assume that a household’s expenditures on insecticides
during the harvest season determine its market participation later in the post-harvest
season. To avoid omitted variable bias from variables that determine both the con-
tainer-level behaviour and market participation, we control for covariates such as
households’ storage goal, the number of storage containers used in the household, the
quantity of maize stored in the household and the type of chemical insecticide. In
addition, we consider factors that reflect how easily a household may obtain chemical
insecticides and market information. Thus, we incorporate the distance from home to
the main market, the presence of an extension agent in the village and the presence of
an input dealer in the village as additional control variables. Another issue could be
that access to pesticides may not be random. Studies and field observations reveal that
many households face constraints to accessing appropriate storage chemical
14We also account for correlation among containers belonging to the same household (repeated
observations) by clustering the estimation at the household level.
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technology. Because access to certified chemical insecticides is limited, many
households use whichever pesticide they believe appropriate to deal with insect dam-
age. They may have access to farm pesticide from any available input dealer in the vil-
lage or in the markets (Ricker-Gilbert and Jones, 2015).15 More generally, we
hypothesise that controlling for covariates that account for market participation and
access to storage insecticides may take care of other possible endogeneity of chemical
use caused by omitted variable bias. Here again, we evaluate the robustness of our
estimate by comparing a parsimonious regression to a full regression.
We also address the potential endogeneity of a household’s subjective belief about
the risk of food contamination in equations (12a), (12b), (13a) and (13b). This covari-
ate might be endogenous, because it most likely depends on a household’s awareness
about the risk of food contamination from the use of chemical insecticides. In each
empirical model, we control for variables that could represent for a household, poten-
tial sources of information about chemical use that also affect the decision to apply
insecticide to a maize container or to sell maize. For example, we account for whether
the household’s head has received any information about how to use chemical insecti-
cides and its impairment effect. We consider a household’s experience from any
reported cases of chemical intoxication in the community. We also believe that char-
acteristics such as the education level of the household’s head and the number of chil-
dren in school could influence how the household perceives the risk of chemical
contamination (Mabe et al., 2017). Furthermore, we use two alternative variables to
determine the directional effect of a household’s subjective belief about the risk of
food safety.
5.2. Reverse causality and simultaneity bias
We address the issues of simultaneity and reverse causality between the tested covari-
ates and the dependent variables by suggesting similar arguments. In equations (12a)
and (12b), we ask households what was their storage goal at the time they were about
to store maize. This assumes that they knew their storage goal before storing and then
applied insecticides to maize stored in a container. Similarly, in the model of market
participation (equations (13a) and (13b)), expenditure on chemical insecticides also
precedes the quantity sold into markets. In fact, many households purchase field
insecticides during the planting season that they later use as chemical insecticides in
storage. Otherwise, they acquire chemical insecticides during the harvest season or
early post-harvest period to apply on maize stocks to be sold later in the season.
It could be argued that a household’s subjective belief about the risk of food con-
tamination at the time of the survey may reflect its experience of using chemical insec-
ticides. In other words, previous use of insecticides could have determined a
household’s perception about the risk of food contamination. However, we treat a
household’s subjective belief about the risk of food contamination as time-invariant
15We also follow a control function approach and test the endogeneity of chemical expenditure.
We use the number of years the household head has belonged to an association or a group in
the village as the instrumental variable. This instrument measures how easily a household may
have access to insecticide through community networks. However, we do not believe that the
instrument could have a direct effect on households’ sale transactions, since for most house-
holds these associations have no direct link with maize marketing. We do not find that chemical
expenditure is endogenous (see online Appendix A).
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in this application supposing that their perception is determined outside the time
variant use of chemical insecticides. In fact, there is little change in most households’
storage practices between the 2 years of our panel survey, which might imply that
households’ subjective belief remains unchanged over time. Because the household’s
subjective beliefs are formed before the decision to use chemical insecticide on grain
stocks and to sell maize, simultaneity bias should also not be an issue.
5.3. Corner solutions
Nearly 20% of households do not participate in maize sales transactions during the
post-harvest season. Our tested covariates that drive a household’s decision to partici-




We use data from a survey conducted in 6 of the 12 departments in Benin. We first
considered the three regions in Benin: North, Centre and South. In each region, we
used reported maize yield to select the 50th percentile of the most productive areas
among the departments. However, we retained one department in the North, Toucou-
touna, based on the prevalence of food insecurity, even though it was not among the
most productive areas. The other steps of the survey to identify the households were
random. Two districts were randomly chosen within a given department. Counties,
called ‘Commune’, were also randomly selected in the district, followed by a random
choice of villages. In the first stage, survey enumerators conducted a census of maize
households in each of the 12 villages to identify the pool of households who produced
maize. In the second stage, 30 households were randomly chosen among these house-
holds. Each person interviewed was the head of the household.
The survey covered a consumption cycle for each household for the two waves of
data collection, namely 2011/2012 and 2013/2014 harvest seasons. The first wave of
data cover 360 households, but only 309 of these households were successfully inter-
viewed during the second wave or had a complete set of information.16 We end up
with a balanced sample of 309 households and 618 individual observations in the bal-
anced panel. But the sample represents an unbalanced panel of 707 observations when
we pool data over storage containers and year.
Attrition is a potential concern. Of 360 households interviewed in the first wave of
data collection, only 314 were successfully interviewed during the second round and,
of these, 309 had complete information. We rely on these 309 households for our bal-
anced panel. Unfortunately, there is no regression-based test for attrition bias in a
two-period Correlated Random Effect (CRE). The regression models in our analysis
control for attrition bias to the extent that attrition is related to the observed covari-
ates and/or time-constant, unobserved effects (Mason and Ricker-Gilbert, 2013). In
addition, none of the tested covariates explains a household’s probability of being re-
interviewed during the second wave (see online Appendix C). As a result, we do not
16We drop one household that reported cultivated area of more than 51 times the sample
average.
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believe attrition bias is likely to arise in this analysis. For the household level analysis,
we weight our sample by the inverse probability of selection to account for the proba-
bility that the household was randomly sampled for interview. Nevertheless, given our
relatively small sample, we make no strong claims regarding the representativeness of
our findings for Benin as a whole.
The survey focused on households’ storage practices during the harvest season and
their market participation during the post-harvest season. Data were collected at the
end of post-harvest seasons or at the early start of a new agricultural cycle.
6.2. Descriptive statistics
We asked households their storage goal at the time they were about to store maize.
More precisely, we recorded the intended use and storage practices for each main con-
tainer in a household. The pooled sample, over storage containers and across survey
waves, represents 707 observations. Table 1 shows that 529 containers are from
households who use only one container, of which 204 (39%) containers are used for
consumption only, 23 (4%) for sales only, and 302 (57%) for both consumption and
sales. Table 1 also indicates that 178 containers are from households who use more
than one container. Among these containers, 12 (7%) are used for consumption only,
32 (18%) for sales only and 134 (75%) for both consumption and sales. Thus, for the
Table 1
Application of chemical insecticide to maize stored in containers
Full sample







=1 if HH uses 1 container
Consumption only 204 35 38
Sale only 23 5 34
Consumption & sale 302 66 37
Total 529 106 37
P-value (0.58) (0.59)
=1 if HH uses more than 1 container
Consumption only 12 12 46
Sale only 32 32 50
Consumption & sale 134 32 49
Total 178 76 48
P-value n/a (0.38)
Full sample – container level
Consumption only 216 47* 40
Sale only 55 37* 47
Consumption & sale 436 98 41
Total 707 182 42
P-value (0.00) (0.19)
Notes: HH stands for household; P-value for t-test (or Chi-square for discrete variables) for the
difference between maize containers intended for sale and maize containers intended for con-
sumption: *P < 0.01; n/a = not applicable.
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pooled sample of 707 observations we end up with 30% of containers intended for
consumption only, 8% for sales only and 62% for both consumption and sales.
Table 1 shows that households decide to apply chemical insecticide to maize con-
tainers based on how they intend to use them. They apply insecticides to 182 (25%)
out of 707 storage containers. However, only 20% of the chemicals sprayed on maize
containers were certified for such use (e.g. Actellic and Sofagrain). The remaining
80% consisted of unidentified surplus farm insecticides. For the full sample, the per-
centage of containers with insecticides applied to them is much higher for storage con-
tainers used to store maize intended for sales (37 out of 55, i.e. 67%) compared to
containers intended for consumption only (47 out of 216, i.e. 22%) and containers
intended for both consumption and sales (98 out of 436, i.e. 22%).
We obtain additional insights when we account for households’ subjective beliefs
about the risk of food contamination. In the full sample, households who kept con-
tainer content for sales only, believe that 47 days of latency is needed on average com-
pared to a belief of 40 days of latency for households using containers for
consumption only. Yet, we do not find strong statistical evidence for this difference
(P = 0.188).
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the main covariates at the household level.
We record a large proportion of maize sellers during the post-harvest season, which
includes the early post-harvest period and the lean period. Maize sellers amount to
432 households (70% of the sample).17 The decision of whether to sell, and the
amount to sell remain almost unchanged over the period of the data collection, as
there is no statistically significant difference between the two waves of data collection
in 2011 and 2013. More specifically, data show that 83% of households who sold
maize in year one sold again in year two. Similarly, 67% of households who did not
sell maize in the first wave, continued to withhold maize from the market in the sec-
ond wave. The real average expenditure on chemical insecticide (2011 being the base
year), the main variable for chemical use, is about 1,270 F CFA (US$ 2.20). Data also
indicate that the amount spent on chemical insecticide and its use did not changed
between the two waves of data collection. The pattern of market participation is
therefore consistent with the storage practices not changing much over time. This sup-
ports our claim that households’ perception of the risk of food contamination from
chemical use has not changed during the 2 years between rounds of our survey.
7. Results
7.1. Main results
Table 3 presents the results of the testing of Hypotheses 1 and 2, about the factors
that affect a household’s decision to apply chemical insecticide to a maize container.
Results are from MC-probit models and estimates represent average partial effects
(APE). Columns (1) to (2) are, respectively, the parsimonious and the full regression
results that test Hypothesis 1. Columns (3) and (4) account for the interaction term to
test Hypothesis 2. Results in column (1) show that a household’s likelihood of apply-
ing chemical insecticide to a maize container intended for sales is about 37 percentage
points higher on average than it is when the container is intended for consumption
only. This estimate is statistically significant with a P-value < 0.01. This result
17About 70% of most important (in volume) sales were made to local or itinerant traders.
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remains almost unchanged when we control for more covariates in column (2). There-
fore, we reject Hypothesis 1 that a household’s goal for their maize has no statistically
significant effect on its decision to apply insecticides to containers intended for sale
compared to containers intended for home consumption. In other words, maize that
is stored to be sold later is more likely to be sprayed with chemical insecticide than
maize held in a container kept for home-consumption.
We obtain additional insights when households are differentiated by their percep-
tion of the risk of food safety. Hypothesis 2 tests how a household’s awareness of the
risk of food contamination influences its decision to apply chemical insecticides to
maize containers allocated to future sales. Results in columns (3) and (4) indicate that
the probability that a household applies chemical insecticide to a maize container
intended for sales increases with its awareness of the health risk of chemical insecti-
cides. In column (3), we find that if there is no perception of a risk of food contamina-
tion, the likelihood that a household uses insecticide on maize held in a container
intended for sales is about 20 percentage points higher on average than it is for maize
held in a container intended for consumption. Households might still apply chemical
insecticides to maize they intend to sell later during the post-harvest season irrespec-
tive of any food safety concern, expecting to have grain to sell later in the season.
However, further analyses of the results in column (3) reveal that food safety concerns
might also influence households’ use of insecticides on maize. In fact, the coefficient
estimate of a household’s likelihood of using chemical insecticide on maize that it
intends to sell increases by about 0.4 percentage points per day of latency when there
is a perceived risk of food contamination. The interaction term between a household’s
storage goal being to sell and its subjective belief about the risk of food contamination
is, indeed, positive and statistically significant, with P-value = 0.05. More specifically,
the joint estimate of this interaction term and the covariate for storage goal being to
sell is statistically significant with a P-value < 0.01.
When we evaluate the coefficient estimates at the mean of the variable ‘number of
latency days a container needs after applying insecticides to be safe to eat’ (36 days),
we find that a household with this belief is on average 33 percentage points more likely
to use insecticide spray on maize stored for sale rather than for consumption. In other
words, the more a household suspects the health risk from applying insecticides to
maize, the more likely it is to spray maize in a container intended for sales than it is to
spray maize in a container intended for consumption. As shown in the conceptual
framework, once the probability of the household believing that the health risks of
insecticides are greater than zero, the valuation of maize quality in the household
could shift further away from home consumption to markets. Our results in column
(4) are not substantially different in magnitude and statistical significance from the
parsimonious results presented in column (3). Clearly, we reject Hypothesis 2, since
the probability of a household applying insecticides to maize that it intends to sell
increases with its subjective belief about the food safety risk associated with using
insecticides (see also online Appendix D for graphical results).
Table 4 presents the results of the testing of Hypotheses 3 and 4. This table shows
how a household’s investments in chemical insecticides and its subjective belief about
food safety affect the quantity of maize that is sold during the post-harvest season.
Results in columns (1) and (2) test Hypothesis 3. More specifically, column (1) corre-
sponds to the parsimonious regression that includes the tested covariates along with
key variables of the container-level behaviour tested under the previous hypotheses.
Column (2) represents the full regression with additional controls. Results in columns
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(3) and (4) include an interaction term between expenditures on insecticides and a
household’s subjective belief about the risk of food contamination and therefore test
Hypothesis 4. In columns (1) and (2), we find that expenditure on chemical insecti-
cides has a positive and statistical significant effect on the quantity of maize sold into
markets once the household decides to sell its stocks. In the parsimonious results in
column (1), we find that an additional 1,000 F CFA (US$ 2.00) spent on insecticides
increases the quantity of maize that is sold by about 5% on average. This is consistent
with our first set of findings indicating that a household is more likely to apply chemi-
cal insecticide to maize that it intends to sell, rather than maize it intends to consume.
Therefore, we reject Hypothesis 3 that the covariate, expenditures on chemical insecti-
cide, has no statistically significant effect on the quantity of maize sold into markets.
Next, we investigate how a household’s subjective belief about the risk of food con-
tamination affects their market transactions when they invest in chemical insecticides.
The corresponding results are presented in columns (3) and (4) of Table 4. In column
(3), we find that a household that is unaware of the health risks of insecticides (e.g.
believes that the number of latency days required for chemicals to be safe is zero) and
yet decides to use them, sells significantly more maize than unaware households who
do not use them. For example, a 1,000 F CFA (US$ 2.00) increase in expenditures on
insecticides by unaware households increases the average quantity of maize that they
sell by about 3%, ceteris paribus. It is reasonable to believe that these households
want to recover some part of their investment in insecticides irrespective of any food
safety concern. Nevertheless, further analysis suggests that the optimum quantity to
sell into markets changes for households who do not perceive a risk of food contami-
nation. Results in column (3) indicate that the interaction term between expenditures
on chemical insecticides and the household’s food safety concern (number of days of
latency needed) is positive and statistically significant. Moreover, the joint estimate of
expenditures on chemical insecticide and its interaction term with food safety is statis-
tically significant with a P-value < 0.01. This implies that maize sales increase by
0.1% for every additional day that households believe that insecticides should remain
latent and for every 1,000 F CFA (US$ 2.00) spent on chemical insecticides. These
results show that households who suspect a food safety risk from applying insecticides
to maize will sell more of their maize stocks than those who do not. We argue, based
on the conceptual framework, that a household’s subjective belief about the risk of
food contamination reduces its marginal cost of investments in quality improvement,
inducing it to sell more maize to the market. Hence, we reject Hypothesis 4: that ‘bad
sellers’ defined as maize sellers who are aware of food safety risks from consuming
maize treated with insecticides sell as much maize into markets as households who are
unaware of this food safety risk and are labelled as ‘uninformed sellers’. Clearly, these
‘bad sellers’ appear to sell more maize into the market.
7.2. Robustness checks
Our findings remain unchanged under different sets of robustness checks. The first
compares the parsimonious regressions to the full regressions. We present the corre-
sponding results in the previous tables.18 An additional robustness check is to replace
18For Hypotheses 1 and 2 the findings also remain consistent under a linear probability model
(see online Appendix E).
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the continuous variable of food safety risk by the binary variable that also measures a
household’s attitude with respect to consuming maize that has been sprayed with
chemical insecticide.19 Using this discrete variable, we still obtain the same findings
for Hypotheses 1 and 2 at the container level (see online Appendix F1). Likewise, our
results for Hypotheses 3 and 4 are consistent with the previous findings for actual
market transactions measured at the household level (see online Appendix F2).
8. Conclusion
Adverse selection, where sellers of maize apply unobservable chemical insecticides to
maize they intend to sell but not to maize they intend to consume, is a potentially
important and under-recognised problem in informal food markets in developing
countries. In this context there is a lack of enforceable quality standards, third-party
verification, and insufficient price premiums to incentivise sellers to invest in practices
that improve quality and reduce risks to consumers. We develop a simple conceptual
model of maize marketing and use household-level panel data from Benin to estimate
how adverse selection could occur in an informal market where participants observe
different features of quality attributes. Asymmetric information arises from sellers’
decisions to adopt practices that could alter unobservable maize quality, such as
applying chemical insecticides to maize, which protect maize from insect attacks, but
may have adverse health risks when consumed by humans. We also consider that sell-
ers are likely to have imperfect information about the health risks associated with
applying chemical insecticides to maize. We empirically estimate how a seller’s subjec-
tive belief about the risk of food safety from applying chemical insecticides to maize
could lead to adverse selection in the market.
We first rely on a conceptual framework to show how a seller’s subjective belief
about the risk of food contamination affects maize allocation in the household. More-
over, empirical evidence reveals adverse selection in Benin’s maize markets that we
trace from storage practices to market transactions. We find that households who are
aware of potential contamination from chemical insecticides are more likely to apply
insecticides to maize intended for sale than on home-consumed maize. Consequently,
such households sell a larger amount of their stock into markets when they use insecti-
cides than households who are unaware of or unconcerned about pesticide contami-
nation. It is indeed rational for a household to sell more maize sprayed with chemical
insecticides into the market to preserve the quantity and quality, knowing that the
grain will look good to buyers, and that buyers will be unable to fully detect if chemi-
cal residues are present.
Hence, adverse selection in informal maize markets may be driven in part by house-
holds’ subjective beliefs about the risk of food contamination. Our results are consis-
tent with a previous work by Hoffmann and Gatobu (2014) and help explain why
many rural sellers value homegrown grain compared to market purchased maize.
Clearly, the prevalence of low quality maize in markets added to the insufficient
19Using a binary variable for a household’s subjective belief allows less variability than a contin-
uous measure would and might therefore introduce greater bias if the variable is not exogenous.
Bontemps and Nauges (2015) suggest a special regressor approach to deal with how a potential
endogenous binary variable used for perception might affect a risk-averting decision which is
also a binary variable. Here, we were unable to find an appropriate special regressor and an
instrument to follow their approach.
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premium for higher quality further reduce incentives for households’ market
participation.
Overall, we emphasise that sellers’ subjective beliefs about unobservable quality
attributes might create more than adverse selection in informal markets. Adverse
selection impedes market participation and may result in serious health risks for con-
sumers. Nevertheless, information about food safety and appropriate storage prac-
tices remain largely imperfect in informal markets to the extent that smallholder
sellers are also exposed to risks from consuming unsafe grains from markets or home
stocks. This situation is partly due to the limited supply of improved post-harvest
inputs such as moisture meters and improved storage containers compared with pro-
duction inputs, like inorganic fertiliser and improved seed, both of which are widely
promoted across SSA. Since increased food production is of limited value if it is
unsafe to eat, policy-makers, donors and development practitioners need to shift some
emphasis and resources into increasing food quality rather than just increasing food
quantity.
Supporting Information
Additional supporting information may be found online in the Supporting Informa-
tion section at the end of the article.
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vest season (Probit-MC).
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